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Vol. I. No. 10

1 Dec. 1943

ARMY TALKS



The Battle of the Atlantic



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EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY



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Foreword

THERE is one front which must be held before successful operations can even begin against the enemy in his strongly entrenched lair on the Continent. This front is the Atlantic Ocean. Here the United States Navy and its allies are fighting the Battle of the Atlantic, a battle of supply.

We are winning the Battle of the Atlantic although constant vigilance and constant effort are still necessary if we are to stay on top. This pamphlet outlines the story of that battle; its problems, its import. It is the story of the Naval fight to clear and to keep cleared a path over which the Allied Armies may travel to get at the Nazi fortress.

It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that our fighting services are constantly learning more about each other through our combined operations. Understanding between the services is a military necessity. May it ever grow and expand to our mutual benefit.

HAROLD R. STARK,
Admiral, United States Navy,
Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Introduction

THE German U-boat was leaking like an egg crate, wallowing drunkenly in the swells of the mid-Atlantic. Depth bombs had brought her to the surface, shells from the deck gun of a United States Coast Guard cutter had smashed through her conning tower. Those of her crew who were still able to do so, plunged over the side.

As they climbed the nets to the deck of the cutter they kept repeating one terrifying phrase :

“ Wasserbomben, terrible **wasserbomben.**”

“ Wasserbomben ” is the German word for “ depth bombs ” and is the clue to the grim war against the submarines that is being fought by the Allied Navies along the North Atlantic and the world's other convoy routes.

The particular sinking described here was typical of that war. Smallest of the escort vessels accompanying a convoy of cargo ships, enroute from the United States to Britain, the cutter was almost a mile ahead of her charges when she first detected the presence of an enemy vessel. Then the sound operator picked up the raider's position, general quarters was sounded and the little cutter wheeled to the attack.

Turning in the trough of the Atlantic swells, she raced over the submerged U-boat, rolling half a dozen depth-charges over the side. Criss-crossing her own wake, the cutter made three depth-bomb attacks, while her gun crews stood taut at their stations waiting for the hoped-for glimpse of the submarine coming to the surface.

The cutter was starting her fourth run when the submarine broke water like a hooked tuna.

Deck guns opened fire aboard the cutter and the bursting shells punched through her superstructure. Part of it was blown away.

The Nazi gunners tried to bring their own deck guns into action. Only the smallest could be served. Within a matter of minutes the Germans abandoned the fight and leaped overboard. Forty were picked up.

The convoy kept on its way, secure because the cutter had won another skirmish in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Endlessly that battle goes on, day after day and night after night the escort ships match their cunning and their fighting ability against the lurking U-boats. They don't always win. We still lose ships. We shall probably keep on losing them until the end of the war. But the convoys get through—bringing the food and weapons and men which are vitally needed on the fighting fronts.

ARMY TALKS

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

THE Battle of the Atlantic is the axle upon which revolves the entire European War. Every battle which Allied armies initiate on land is dependent upon the success of Allied navies guarding our lines of supply and feeding the forces which are today moving forward in the direction of Berlin.

Engaged in this struggle is one of the greatest concentrations of sea and air power the world has ever seen. Included are considerable portions of the United States, British and Allied Navies, considerable concentrations of aircraft and the merchant fleets of nearly all the 31 United Nations, pitted against Germany's powerful submarine fleet, her small, but potent, surface navy and the remains of her once-dominant Luftwaffe.

Behind the strategy of the sea war are the brains of the world's naval authorities. The charts and maps upon which they lay their plans depict an area of more than ten-million square miles of ocean.

To win the war Germany must break the supply lines which bind the Allied nations in Europe and Africa with those who supply the weapons and materials of war — the British Dominions,

Latin America and the United States.

The United Nations to win this war must maintain those supply lines, must protect them from hostile attack and must keep the bridge of ships stretching across the sea.

Allied victory is riding on the decks of the ships that daily reach Allied ports in Europe. Ships were responsible for the smashing Allied victory in Africa. Ships opened the second front in Europe with the invasion of Italy. Ships made it possible for England to carry on through her darkest hour, the Battle of Britain. And ships carried much of the equipment which Russia is using.

At the very outbreak of hostilities Hitler snapped **what** he called his counter-blockade around Britain which was as tight as a rubber glove. In the grim months which followed, as the Prime Minister told the House of Commons, the British Isles were twice on the verge of starvation.

The real squeeze came after the Germans overran Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France. With thousands of miles of Atlantic coastline in his possession, Hitler could threaten the Atlantic supply lines

This issue of ARMY TALKS was prepared by the staff of the United States Navy bureau of Public Relations in the European Theater of Operations. The information contained in it has been embodied in press releases, official Navy communiqués and other official and semi-official sources. The purpose of the issue is to tell men who fight on the ground and in the air what the fellows who fight afloat have done and are doing in the job of which we are all a part.

with attacks launched from bases from the North Cape to the Pyrenees.

The Luftwaffe, which had the edge in the skies over Britain and the eastern approaches to the Atlantic, carried half the load of the counter-blockade. Submarines and surface raiders operating west of the approaches toward the mid-Atlantic and along the sea routes to Britain carried the other half.

Britain in a Trap

Britain up to the end of 1942 was between the jaws of a trap which her limited Air Force and scattered Navy could barely cope with.

Allied ships were forced to run the gauntlet of first packs of submarines and later the Luftwaffe when they were nearing home waters and port.

The British Home Fleet, despite strength superior to the German Navy, was not able to provide the necessary protection for convoys because of its scattered disposition. The main force of warships was needed to stand guard over the British Islands themselves, and ward off possible invasion. Other large units were necessary in the North Atlantic to watch the actions of the German surface Navy. An insufficient number of vessels remained to escort and protect the supply ships en route to and from Britain.

A comparison of the sea war of the first and second World Wars will present a better understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic as it is being fought today.

The objects of both sides in 1914 and 1939 were much the same. Each proclaimed blockades, the Allies in 1914 against Germany and German occupied countries and the Kaiser against France and Britain. In the current war, however, the enemy was in a better position than during the first two years of World War I.

Germany's Navy was not nearly so



well prepared in 1914 to conduct a successful sea war as it was in 1939 when Hitler unleashed his powerful fleet of improved U-boats to break the supply lines between Britain, her Dominions and the United States. He began a long series of sinkings in the first week of war, sending the big British liner *Athenia* to the bottom. In the first 22 months of this war enemy submarines sank a total of seven and one half million tons of British shipping. The Luftwaffe, a powerful ally to the submarine, pounded British ports and convoys which the submarines had missed and which were nearing port within range of airfields in France and Norway. Planes in the last war had little to do with the sea war.

Enemy Took Round One

Although in this war, as in the last war, Germany won the opening rounds of the Atlantic submarine battle, in neither case was she able to maintain her advantage. Allied counter measures in both cases proved able to provide an effective defense and then to swing into the offensive against the U-boat.

In 1914 when Germany brought out the submarine as a secret weapon she herself did not realize the possibilities of the U-boat. The handful of vessels which she sent to sea were vastly different and vastly inferior to the modern undersea raider. The U-boats improved steadily all through the war, but the Armistice found them still highly vulnerable.

The submarine today is a first-line vessel, capable of operating for long

periods over great distances. Its striking power includes not only deck guns but many torpedoes and effective defenses against aircraft. They are protected by an outer skin that shields the inner shell and machinery.

Mines were More Deadly

In the first year of World War I only three British merchant ships fell prey to enemy U-boats as compared with 42 sunk by mines. Modern submarines have sunk many times that number in a day during the present war.

The successes of the two submarine campaigns in the early periods of both wars are results of virtually the same situations. German U-boats in World War I began to exact a toll of Allied shipping primarily because Allied merchant ships travelled alone and unarmed. In 1917 the Allies began arming their merchant ships and adopted the convoy system. During April, 1917, Britain lost 789,670 dead-weight tons of shipping. The month following when her ships were armed and travelling in convoys her losses dropped 40 per cent. and never again reached the April peak.

To be sure, convoys were set up at once. But losses were heavy because the Allies did not have sufficient protection for their vessels. Hitler's system of sending out packs of submarines and later in fleets or echelons of packs were more than a match for the lightly protected convoys.

Allied Naval escort vessels and

planes today are defeating the U-boat just as they did in the last war.


Allied Governments in 1942 decided on the new dual convoy escort system embracing new-type surface vessels and utilizing the long-range patrol planes. Backbone of the surface escort fleet is the destroyer escort ship, smaller than the destroyer but carrying most of the destroyer's armament and designed specifically to engage undersea raiders. Among others added to the escort fleet are sub chasers, corvettes and frigates, all constructed especially for convoy duty. These vessels are the children of the "mosquito" fleet of the last war, the tiny anti-submarine ships that operated in the enemy submarine hunting grounds.

The "Air Umbrella"

The first air umbrella for convoys was developed in Britain. Planes of the Coastal Command took off from British airfields to pick up convoys and escort them to port primarily for protection against enemy aircraft. The early successes the planes scored against submarines resulted in the adoption of air patrols in Newfoundland and Allied leaders eventually established patrols for incoming and outgoing convoys at both the eastern and western approaches to the Atlantic. This patrol was later augmented by bases established in Greenland and Iceland and more recently in the Azores. Small auxiliary aircraft carriers operating with nearly every important convoy filled in every gap.

Just as she did in 1914, Germany in 1939 opened her undersea war at the eastern approaches of the Atlantic. When the Home Fleet and RA broke the siege she moved, as in 1914, to the mid-Atlantic and then to the east coast of the United States. The modern submarine's ability to operate at greater distances than those of 1914





permitted Germany to launch campaigns in 1940 and 1941 in the Caribbean and then the South Atlantic around South America and off the southern and western coasts of Africa. The war in Africa and the northern route to Russia also opened new U-boat hunting grounds. Whereas in 1914 the main Allied supply route was over the north Atlantic, sea lanes of the current war stretch throughout the entire ten million square miles of the ocean.

Huge New Demands

The advancement in mechanized war also has had its effect on the sea war. Today mechanized armies must have from five to 12 tons of equipment per man plus one ton each to maintain him for a month. An armored division in action uses 650 tons of gasoline, 600 tons of ammunition and 35 tons of food per day. To keep it in battle requires the arrival of one Liberty Ship every eight days. At the height of American maritime strength in the last war, October, 1918, our every use of shipping for overseas maintenance, domestic imports and aid to the Allies employed less tonnage than is needed in this war for maintenance alone.

As inadequate as Allied naval forces were to cope with the enemy's powerful air force and submarine fleet in 1939, they were able to establish a sea blockade of the Continent that virtually suspended all enemy commerce on the high seas.

Broken up into numerous fleets and forces, Allied naval power was able to control the movements of virtually all merchant shipping in every corner of the globe.

German air and sea power was effective only over and under the sea. The enemy fleet was unable to provide protection for any large movements of merchant vessels which might attempt

to make a run across the Atlantic to Europe.

The Allies in 1939, were not seriously concerned with the possibilities of enemy merchant vessels sneaking past patrolling Allied naval units. The big question was how to permit neutral nations to continue an uninterrupted flow of trade while at the same time preventing supplies carried in non-belligerent vessels from reaching enemy hands. To cut off neutral trade entirely would have driven friendly nations into the enemy fold and robbed the Allies of supplies which neutral nations were able to furnish.

To overcome such a situation it was decided to issue compulsory navicerts to all ships whose destinations were either Europe or Africa. Under the plan every ship sailing for a European or North African port must be examined and approved by Allied consular officials at the ports of loading before sailing toward the blockade. This system has eliminated the tedious and time-wasting process of halting and searching neutral vessels at sea or at Contraband Control Ports. Ships not possessing navicerts are regarded as blockade runners and halted miles from their destinations for seizure if they are neutrals carrying contraband; for capture or sinking if they are enemy vessels.

The System Works

The navicert system has worked very successfully. Only a small percentage of supplies destined for enemy hands has succeeded in slipping past Allied naval vessels patrolling on the high seas or off the coasts of the Continent.

The purpose of the Allied blockade has been carried out successfully: that of the enemy counter-blockade has failed. Despite German's superior advantages and the inferior position of the Allies during the opening rounds of

the Battle of the Atlantic, Hitler has failed to cut the supply lanes to Britain while the United Nations are steadily cutting off his sources of supply.

Enemy attacks on Allied shipping during 1940 and 1941 resulted only in a stalemate. Britain staggered under mighty blows from aircraft and submarines but she failed to go down for the count. During the first two years she maintained her blockade of the Continent, did the best she could to protect her supply lines, frustrated Hitler's plans for invasion, weathered the blitz, and set out to perfect her own air force and expand her navy.

U.S. Destroyers Helped

The trade of 50 reconditioned destroyers which the United States made with Britain in return for the use of Atlantic bases relieved some of the pressure exerted on her merchant shipping.

Toward the end of 1941 a deadlock began to develop which the enemy throughout 1942 failed to break. Britain knew then that she had weathered the worst. She had perfected her Royal Air Force, established new bases for operations, made valuable additions to her Navy and enlarged her merchant fleet, which had suffered such serious losses.

Across the sea, the United States, injected suddenly into the war by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, already was engaged in establishing a strong air force, expanding its fleet and mass-production of Liberty Ships to bridge the ocean.

Allied naval power in the Atlantic today is made up roughly of the British Home Fleet, the United States Atlantic Fleet and the task and patrol forces comprising both British and American warships plus naval units of Norway, Holland, Greece, France, Belgium and lately Italy.

The greatest Allied naval forces are first the British Home Fleet guarding Britain, the main base of Allied supplies, second the U.S. Atlantic Fleet protecting America and the sea lanes stretching toward Europe and third naval units engaged in protecting the approaches to the Mediterranean through which supplies must pass en route to Italy and the southern battle fronts.

Allied naval task forces and convoy escort patrols, watch dogs of the seas, protect the vulnerable center of United Nations supply lines between their two anchors in America and the British Isles.


The strength and disposition of Allied naval units is a matter of military security, but it can be said that they include numerous battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and hundreds of small, specially designed and equipped anti-submarine vessels built solely for convoy protection.

The German Navy at the beginning of the war was made up of some 400 submarines, which were designed to carry the load of the enemy's sea war. Supplementing the undersea fleet was a strong surface force of six battleships and pocket-battleships, from seven to ten cruisers and a number of destroyers and other supporting and auxiliary craft.

A Hit-and-Run Navy

The German Navy never was intended to seek engagements with Allied surface vessels on any major scale. It has been used throughout the war to raid Allied merchant and naval shipping with hit-and-run tactics. When German warships did run into a hostile naval vessel it was by accident—and the results were usually disastrous for the swastika flag.

Its early successes were scored only because the Allies did not have



sufficient sea and naval forces to guard their coasts and protect their vessels at sea. In the first 22 months of war Britain lost seven-and-a-half million tons of shipping, a monthly destruction of approximately one-and-one-half per cent. of her original shipping. During three months of 1943—June, July and August—Allied naval and air forces sank a total of 90 German submarines, almost a submarine a day. During the same period scores of Allied convoys crossed the Atlantic without losing one ship.

Other factors besides the naval and merchant shipbuilding programs figured in the changing picture.

Establish Air Bases

Britain witnessed the success of German air attacks on her shipping early in the war and began immediately to establish a chain of air bases to counteract enemy blows. The first air bases from which Allied planes operated in escorting convoys were in the British Isles. Planes of the Coastal Command flew far to sea to meet every convoy nearing or leaving port to both protect them from air attack and spot submarines awaiting the approach of the ships. A short time later similar bases were established in Newfoundland to protect convoys leaving or nearing Canada and the United States. Subse-

quently others were established in Greenland, Iceland and last September in the Azores. These bases ultimately provided convoys with a constant air umbrella over their entire sea routes.

Build Small Carriers

To provide convoys operating out of the range of Allied bases in the North Atlantic, the Allies have constructed small auxiliary aircraft carriers equipped with both scout planes and attack bombers capable of ferreting out and sinking enemy submarines.

Growing Allied air power has more than facilitated shift of Allied sea war from a defense to an offense just as its planes have taken the offense in raids from the once dominant Luftwaffe.

Aside from escorting convoys, planes of the RAF and USAAF have augmented the sea war by:

1. Crippling submarine pens, repair shops, fueling stations and ports used by enemy sea forces.
2. Blasting schools, barracks and training centers where reserve crews were concentrated for future operations.
3. Smashing factories and assembly plants turning out planes and submarines and spare parts, weakening enemy attack forces.
4. Sinking and damaging a large

part of the German surface fleet and keeping the whereabouts of the largest surface craft on Allied records for most of the war.

5. Constructing a new-type plane which has been of material assistance to naval forces in keeping British waters free from German magnetic mines. Equipped with a secret device, this plane is used to first locate the mines and then explode them harmlessly from the air.

The vital role of smashing the chain of German naval, air and supply bases along Europe's conquered coasts was delegated early in the war to amphibious forces, composed of specially-trained units of the British Army operating with vessels of the British Home Fleet.

The Rangers Strike

Attacks by Allied amphibious forces, composed mostly today of British Commandos and American Rangers, have had significant effects on the success of the Allied sea war and the failure of the German counter-blockade. With the utmost secrecy, the amphi-


bious forces have struck at selected targets in nearly every one of the occupied countries, destroying and seriously damaging ports and harbors, docks and submarine berths, huge fuel dumps and weather stations, lookout posts and factories.

Time-tables Set Back

Enemy time-tables of attacks on Allied shipping often were set back days, weeks and finally months by these raids.

Probably the most spectacular of the long series of attacks carried out by amphibians was the raid on St. Nazaire, captured French port on the Loire River only 250 miles from the nearest British port. It was from St. Nazaire that many of the U-boats which scored their greatest successes in 1940 and 1941 were operating. Nine heavily-reinforced submarine pens had been completed at St. Nazaire and five others were under construction. The port had every facility for the maintenance, repair and provisioning of U-boats. In addition it had the only port on the Atlantic seaboard which was capable of handling the Tirpitz, Germany's largest battleship.

The entire port was constructed around a huge lock gate which was used as the main entrance to the inner port



housing docks, submarine pens and the maintaining tides in the inner docks.

One of the 50 reconditioned destroyers which the United States traded to Britain was sacrificed in the raid. The vessel, HMS Campbeltown, formerly the USS Buchanan, led a flotilla of destroyers and other small craft into the port, rammed the main lock gate, became hopelessly imbedded in the structure and completed its destruction with delayed-action demolition charges which blew up both the ship and the gates later.

Blow Up Locks

Demolition parties from the other vessels destroyed vital installations including an old and secondary lock gate, a pumping station, quays, bridges, the submarine pens and a large merchant vessel lying near the entrance of the second lock.

In this attack, said the British Ministry of Information, the strategic balance in the Atlantic was materially, perhaps decisively, improved.

Air, sea and amphibious assaults on bases and units of Hitler's small but potent surface navy have given his larger warships a virtually negligible score card for the past two years. The only important contributions which his surface navy has made toward the German sea war were those of the battle cruisers. In 1941 the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank 22 British merchant vessels.

Since then every large unit of the German surface navy has been either bottled up in port or damaged in attacks by various Allied forces.

Germany lost her first capital ship early in the war when three light British warships ran across the battle-

ship Graf Spee on a raiding mission in the South Atlantic. Following a brief engagement at sea, the Graf Spee fled into the harbor of Montevideo, Uruguay, where her crew scuttled her several days later.

Planes of the RAF damaged the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau when they were based at Brest, France, and other aircraft have delivered successful attacks on the cruisers Prince Eugen and Hipper. Last September the battleship Tirpitz, sister ship of the ill-fated Bismarck, was damaged by British midget submarines which penetrated her hiding place in a Norwegian fjord to send several torpedoes crashing into her side.

Hitler's large warships have been little more than added expense since May, 1941, when British planes and warships sank the Bismarck less than a week after she left port on her first venture into the Atlantic.

Sneaking out of Kiel Bay with an escort including the Prince Eugen and several destroyers and gunboats, the Bismarck made her way to a fjord near Bergen, Norway. Her movements, however, had not gone unnoticed by the British. A plane of Coastal Command on a routine flight over Norway spotted the flotilla at anchor and took the pictures which started the greatest sea hunt in history.

Nazis Sink H.M.S. Hood

On May 24 the Bismarck won her first, last and only victory over the British fleet, sinking during a brief engagement the battle cruiser Hood and damaging the battleship Prince of Wales. Three days later she was found apparently en route to port for either hiding or repairs and was attacked by torpedo carrying planes from a British aircraft carrier, one of a force of many

ships that had been called up to engage the German raider.

In that attack the steering apparatus of the Bismarck was rendered ineffective and she was helpless when the main force of British warships arrived. They opened fire on the German vessel immediately and in less than an hour had turned her into a blazing, battered, worthless hulk.

Hitler since then has refrained from sending out his largest surface vessels. Their only subsequent contribution to the sea war has been tying up parts of the British Home Fleet, which must watch and wait until they venture out—or surrender in their lairs.

Germany won the first stages of the Battle of the Atlantic because she was better prepared to conduct an offensive against inadequate Allied sea and air forces. The bases which she captured in the fall of Norway, the Low Countries and France put ravenous teeth into her counter-blockade.

Sea War Summary

The United Nations are winning the last rounds because Germany failed to cut the supply lanes to Britain and prevent the Allies from building up sea and air forces which are

driving the Luftwaffe from the skies, submarines from the seas and disrupting the flow of enemy supplies and his ability to produce the weapons needed by his land armies to continue operations.


The RAF and USAAF have about eliminated the threat of the Luftwaffe and have turned their sights on German war factories and his sources of supply.

The Winning Team

Expanded naval forces supported by the fleet and other air arms are sinking submarines faster than Hitler can build them; are bringing to the European battlefronts thousands of new merchant vessels carrying millions of tons of weapons and millions of troops which will eventually drive the German legions back into the Reich and give them the crushing defeat which the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin say is not too far ahead.

Merchant ships which are now being built faster than the enemy can possibly sink them will soon total in tonnage almost as much as the combined merchant fleets of all the warring nations at the beginning of the war.

The Battle of the Atlantic is fast approaching its climax, the finale for Hitler, the restoration of peace in Europe and the opening of a great offensive in the Pacific which will ring down the curtain on World War II.





Preparation

Why We Should Discuss This Topic : The Battle of the Atlantic is a very personal affair to each of us in ETO. Everyone of us is a participant. For most of us it has been for a time a matter of life and death. Our very lives—the fact that we are safely here—have depended on the incessant battle of the sea and air routes of the North Atlantic. Even now, every meal we eat, every item of clothing or equipment we are issued, depends on the progress of the United Nations in this battle.

But why should we discuss this topic? What is there to provoke thought and discussion? It is the purpose of ARMY TALKS to help all of us to keep ourselves informed, and to help us realize that we each have an important part to play in this life and death struggle. But what does the Battle of the Atlantic have to do with this struggle? Just this. All other victories have depended and will depend upon victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Lest we forget what we owe to those who search out the U-boats and destroy them; lest we fail to fully understand the vital necessity of safe transport of personnel and material across the North Atlantic; this issue of ARMY TALKS presents another chapter in the drama of the war at sea.

Hitler won round one of the Battle of the Atlantic. The United Nations have won round two. Round three is coming up. How we shall win this round is told, insofar as military security will permit, in this issue of ARMY TALKS.

It is suggested that discussion leaders reread "War on the Supply Lines" and "War in the Mediterranean" in preparation for their introductory talk on the Battle of the Atlantic. Each of these earlier issues contain helpful suggestions and questions which may be helpful in making this a provocative and vital discussion. Special attention should be given to news items in The Stars and Stripes and Yank which have a bearing on this topic.

Why not select two or more members of the group in advance and request them to prepare themselves to take a position on opposite sides of one or more of the questions raised on this page as a means of starting the discussion?

Make your initial talk brief, state facts, your own opinions, raise questions, ask what the men think.

The following questions should help to start the discussion:

Could the United Nations win the War if they lost the Battle of the Atlantic? Why?

Could Germany win the War if she won the Battle of the Atlantic? Why?

Why has the German Navy not played a more effective part in the War?

Why did the United Nations lose round one of the Battle of the Atlantic?

Why did the United Nations win round two of the Battle of the Atlantic?

Can Germany win round three of the Battle of the Atlantic? Why?

What relation has the Battle of the Atlantic to War in the Mediterranean? The victories of the Russian Armies? The opening of the Second Front on the Western Coast of Europe? The landings and missions of Commandos and Rangers? The RAF and the USAAF?

The worst possible way to use an issue of ARMY TALKS is to read it aloud to the discussion group. Most men, reading from a printed page, tend to let their voices drop into a monotone which simply puts their audience to sleep instead of stimulating thought and discussion. Use the pamphlet as the source, but not the text, for a brief talk of your own on the Battle of the Atlantic.

